Sven coop player models flecktarn
Game theory also plays an important role in deciding how a user must react to an event played by other users in order to maximize its utility (a measure of preferences over some set of strategies).
SVEN COOP PLAYER MODELS FLECKTARN LICENSE
Here, we focus on spectrum sharing in licensed frequency bands with primary users as license holders. Cellular operators that use WAN-WiFi are prime candidates for using games to share spectrum in licensed bands. Heterogeneous wireless systems are an example of unlicensed-band devices that rely on games for spectrum sharing. Cognitive radio networks can be used for spectrum sharing both in unlicensed and licensed bands by using methods that can combine unused frequency bands and share them dynamically and. Spectrum sharing via game theory occurs in both licensed and unlicensed bands and. Game theory is the study of cooperation and conflict between cognitive decision-makers, which, in this context, are represented by cognitive radios (a radio that changes its transmitter parameters based on feedback from the environment) in a wireless network. Game theory has played an important role in developing efficient algorithms for sharing a common spectrum between secondary users.
To facilitate this, we introduce a self-organizing mechanism and assess it by modeling the network as a queue that allows both classes of user to wait in a queue to access the channel modeled as a server.
The users who wish to use the spectrum but do not have the primary license are called the secondary users, and they can opportunistically access the channel when the primary user is idle. A primary approach for increasing the efficiency of spectrum allocation is to allow a second group of unlicensed users to use it when the spectrum is idle. Although the dominant spectrum allocation method (i.e., fixed allocations) is easy to implement, it does not maximize channel efficiency since the license holders (primary users) generally do not utilize their allocated spectrum at all times. This increasing demand places a significant burden on the limited wireless spectrum. The equilibrium maximizes the total utility of the network and allows spectrum sharing between primary and secondary cognitive users.ĭemand is growing rapidly for wireless communication technologies, such as wireless data links, mobile telephones, and wireless medical technologies. The Stackelberg game formulation shows the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium using an appropriate cost function. The gain in utility monotonically increases until the network is saturated. We find that in the Stackelberg game, the leader can improve its utility by influencing followers’ decisions using its advertised cost function and the number of followers accepted in the network.
Next, we study a Stackelberg competition with the primary license holder as the leader and investigate the impact of multiple leaders by modeling the wireless channel as an M/D/1 queue. Our results demonstrate the viability of using this strategy to inform and create more efficient cognitive radio networks.
SVEN COOP PLAYER MODELS FLECKTARN SERIES
Upon introduction of this new player, we present and test a series of predictive algorithms that shows improvements in wireless channel utilization over traditional collision-detection algorithms. We use a novel game strategy (which we call altruism) to “police” a wireless network by monitoring the network and finding the non-cooperative players. Using a Stackelberg game strategy, we evaluate the improvement in performance of a cognitive radio network with these hybrid cognitive players using an M/D/1 queuing model. In this work, however, we modify this strategy to one in which players are hybrid, i.e., both cooperative and non-cooperative. The majority of cognitive radio schemes bifurcate the role of players as either cooperative or non-cooperative. We consider a cognitive wireless network in which users adopt a spectrum sharing strategy based on cooperation constraints.